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breach of a contract, it must follow the rule in force within the juris-
diction where the judgment is recovered.' (2) The law of the juris-
diction where the contract was made, however, governs where there
was an express or implied agreement to pay interest. Of course, In
the light of the admitted majority rule that the lex loci instead of the
leo fori will govern as to damages, the latter statement [(2) above]
is to be accepted. The former statement, however, tacitly admits that
damages (interest here) shall be governed by the lex fori, as being
procedural in nature.
It would seem, then, that in our majority rule we have another
"anomaly in the law", and that any court, if it so desired, should feel
justified in disregarding precedent, and holding the law of damages
to be procedural and not substantive, for logic itself would be behind
the action. HowAD H. WHITEHEAD.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-REGULATION BY STATUTE.
In surveying the statute books of the several states of the United
States, with the objective of ascertaining those statutes which either
expressly define or apply the term, criminal negligence, it becomes
obvious that to obtain some semblance of orderly treatment, a group-
ing is desirable. It can be said that statutes as a whole are either
vague as to definitions, or narrow as to application of criminal negli-
gence to injuries to the person or property whether resulting In death
to the person or not.
The primary step in applying the theory of criminal negligence is
illustrated by statutes providing, "In every crime or public offense,
there must exist the union or joint operation of act and intent, or
criminal negligence". Arizona, California, Idaho and Montana have
this type of statute as a basic structure from which their statutes
dealing with criminal negligence evolve.
It might be relevant to note at this time that those statute books
containing chapters on "Words and Phrases", or chapters containing
"Definitions of Terms", almost as an entirety define and name the
test of negligence in terms of the tort standard, i. e. "want of such
attention to the nature or probable consequences of the act or omission
as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns." 2
"Criminal negligence", as expressly defined by Georgia and South
1 Grimshaw v. Bender, 6 Mass. 77 (1809), cited note 8, supra: Bar-
ringer v. King, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 9 (1855); Eaton v. Mellus, 73 Mass.
(7 Gray) 566 (1856).
'Winthrop v. Carleton, 12 Mass. 4 (1815); French v. French, 126
Mass. 360 (1879).
'Rev. Code of Arizona (1923), Sec. 4486; Gen. Laws of California
(1931), See. 20; Code of Idaho (1932), Ch. 17, Sec. 114; Rev. Code of
Montana, Sec. 10726.
2 California Penal Code (1931), See. 7. (Typical of all such statu-
tory definitions.)
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Carolina statutes is, "Any person employed in any capacity, by any
railroad doing business within the state, shall in the course of such
employment, be guilty of negligence, either by omission of duty or by
any act of commission, in relation to matters entrusted to him from
which serious bodily injury but not death, occurs to another, he shall
be guilty of criminal negligence." 3 This statute is restricted to in-
juries arising out of railroad employment. South Carolina also pro-
vides, "any person having control of a railroad train . . . guilty of
gross carelessness or neglect ... may be punished. ' 4 Alabama pun-
ishes any engineer failing to use the proper precautions.5 Statutes of
this type are prevalent throughout the states. Many other states have
statutes applicable to the operation of boats such as "negligently over-
loading"," covered by Norh Dakota, South Dakota, and New York.
"Negligent mismanagement of a boat . . . to endanger life . . . is a
criminal offense,"7 in Oregon, which is comparable to South Carolina's
statute covering management or control of a railroad train, cited
previously.
The statute most nearly approaching a literal application of crim-
inal negligence is found under the Texas statute entitled "Negligent
Homicide", providing, "whoever, in performance of a lawful act, shall
by negligence or carelessness, cause the death of another, is guilty of
negligent homicide in the first degree."0  For the crime to fall under
this statute, "There must be an apparent danger of causing death."
Negligent homicide is distinguished from excusable homicide by "the
want of proper care and caution". Further, there must be "no appar-
ent Intention to kill" and the "homicide must be the consequence of
the act done or attempted to be done". Michigan restricts the appli-
cation of its statute, which is similar, to injuries arising out of the
operation of motor vehicles.'
Statutes entitled "Motor Vehicle Statutes on Negligence"," are
found in Michigan, Minnesota, Louisiana and Connecticut. "Culpable
Negligence", is, as treated by the Florida statutes, comparable to crim-
inal negligence, wherein the statute provides, "whoever through culp-
able negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of others, inflicts
injuries . . . shall be punished".n
Code of Georgia (Penal), (Parks, 1914), Sec. 117; South Carolina
Code of Laws (1932), Sec. 1689.
'South Carolina Code of Laws (1932), Sec. 1690.
5 Code of Alabama (1923), Sec. 5333.
"North Dakota Comp. Laws (1913 S. 1925), Sec. 9707; South
Dakota Comp. Laws (1929), Sec. 4125; New York Consol. Laws (Cahill,
1930), See. 1S90.
ICode of Oregon (1930), Chap. 14, Sec. 206.
'Texas Penal Code (1925), Art. 1231-1237.
"Michigan Comp. Laws (1929), Sec. 16743.
"'Louisiana Code of Crim. Pro. (1932), See. 1047; Michigan Comp
Laws (1929), Sec. 16743; Minnesota General Statutes (1923), Sec.
10032; General Statutes of Connecticut (1930), Sec. 56-47.
',Rev. General Laws of Florida (1920), Sec. 7164.
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Involuntary manslaughter is included in this grouping due to the
common similarity of terms used. Utah, Montana and New Mexico
have statutes providing "involuntary manslaughter... by unlawful
acts or commission of a lawful act ... without due caution or cir-
cumspection", 2 which illustrates the point.
Kansas and Mississippi statutes differ from that of Utah only in
the use of "culpable negligence" instead of "without due caution or
circumspection".'% 3 The statutes of Illinois, Georgia, Colorado and
Arkansas provide "a lawful act which might probably produce such
consequences","' for their only variation from the original Utah statute.
Idaho and California provide "a lawful act without due caution or cir-
cumspection"" for their variant from the aforementioned basic statute.
These brief groupings can be summarized by simply noting that the
Utah statute is the model from which all others take slight variations,
and yet remain related to it by the common subject matter "involun-
tary manslaughter". Arkansas has a statute dealing with the opera-
tion of steam apparatus and steam boats wherein it provides "death
resulting from negligence in overloading a boat or . . . in placing ex-
cessive steam in the boilers of a boat ... is involuntary man-
slaughter".
The second classification, which is manslaughter, is so made be-
cause these statutes expressly recognize a variance in the degree of the
felony, whereas the prior grouping, more or less, are applicable to par-
ticular offenses, or to those felonies not falling within the statutory
interpretation of felony under the heading of manslaughter proper.
Oregon and Wyoming statutes define manslaughter as ". . . every other
killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negli-
gence ... when such killing is not murder in the first or second de-
gree . . . shall be deemed manslaughter"." Oklahoma places the same
offense under manslaughter in the first degree.'2
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota and New l3hampshire fol-
low New York's statute providing "every killing of a human being by
the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, which under
the provisions of this chapter, is not murder or manslaughter in the
first degree, or is not justifiable homicide, is second degree man-
32Rev. Stat. of Utah (1933), Chap. 103-28-5; Rev. Code of Mon-
tana (1921), Sec. 10959; New Mexico Statutes (1929), Chap. 35,
Sec. 305.
'1Rev. Stat. of Kansas (1923 S. 1933), Chap. 21-414; Mississippi
Code (1930), Sees. 997 and 1002.
' Illinois Rev. Stat. (1935), Sec. 38-842; Code of Georgia (1914 S.
1926), Sec. 67; Colorado Stat. (Courtright, 1927), Sec. 1757; Arkansas
Stat. (Crawford & Moses), See. 2356.
IsCode of Idaho (1932), c. 17-1106; Gen. Laws of California (1931),
Sec. 192.
"'Arkansas Stat. (1921), Secs. 2362 and 2313.
"Code of Oregon (1930), c. 14, See. 210; Wyoming Rev. Stat.
(1931), c. 32, Sec. 205.
'2Oklahoma Stat. (1931), Sec. 2228.
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slaughter"." A still further variation is brought out by the Vermont
statute, which though listed previously under motor vehicle statutes,
nevertheless provides that "such shall not be a bar to prosecution for
manslaughter".
The Texas statute on negligent homicide heretofore considered,
where homicide resulted in the performance of a lawful act, is con-
sidered in this grouping from the viewpoint of its second provision
applying to homicide resulting in the performance of an unlawful act.
The statutory sections under this provide, that the same rules will
apply as in the prior section, with the distinction that, where homicide
resulted in the performance of an unlawful act, "There must be an in-
tent to commit a felony though no apparent intention to kill another".
If such a combination of circumstances is present, Texas places it as
negligent homicide in the second degree. Since the Texas statute on
manslaughter contains no reference to the element of criminal negli-
gence, it seems that this statute on negligent homicide resulting in the
performance of an unlawful act, supplies the deflciency?.A
Michigan has a negligent homicide statute similar to that of
Texas, but it falls in this grouping due to the fact that it is restricted
to motor vehicle operation and is the converse of the Texas statute
mentioned heretofore, in that it lies in the jury's discretion, if the de-
fendant is found not guilty of manslaughter to render a verdict of
guilty of negligent homicide.- ' Kansas also previously classified under
involuntary manslaughter, in addition, terms such offenses as third
degree manslaughter.3  Wisconsin provides "where such killing...
is not declared murder or manslaughter of some other degree, it shall
be deemed manslaughter in the fourth degree".2 Kansas brings crim-
inal negligence into fourth degree manslaughter if homicide results
from culpable negligence.4  Mississippi, Florida, Wyoming and Mis-
souri, though their respective statutes contain the term "culpable neg-
ligence", nevertheless follow the common law and make no distinction
as to the degree of manslaughter. Georgia, Arizona, Oregon and
Nevada hold the same way, and vary from the prior citation only by
the substitution of "lawful act without due caution"," in the place of
"culpable negligence'.
SConsol. Laws of New York (Cahill, 1930), See. 1052; Minnesota
Gen. Stat. (1923), See. 10078; Comp. Laws of North Dakota (1913 S.
1925), Sec. 9491; Public Laws of New Hampshire (1926), c. 392-9;
Comp. Laws of South Dakota (1929), See. 4024.
"Public Laws of Vermont (1933), c. 212-5152.
-' Texas Penal Code (1925), Art. 1238-1241.
2\Michigan Comp. Laws (1929), Sec. 16744.
'
2 Rev. Stat. of Kansas (1923), c. 21-414.
12WIsconsin Stat. (1933), c. 340-26.
"Rev. Stat. of Kansas (1923), c. 21-420.
M5Mississippi Code (1930), See. 1023; Comp. Gen. Laws of Florida
(1927), See. 7141; Wyoming Rev. Stat. (1931), c. 32-205; Missouri
Rev. Stat. (1929), See. 3988.
'Code of Georgia (Parks, 1914, S. 1926), See. 64; Rev. Code of
Arizona (1923), Sec. 4586; Code of Oregon (1930), c. 14-206; Comp.
Laws of Nevada (1929), Sec. 10069.
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The third classification under murder is justified in that it Is the
extreme interpretation and substitution of criminal negligence for the
absence of intent and at the same time is the least specific as to defi-
nition as to actually what constitutes criminal negligence by statute.
New York, Colorado, Alabama, Washington and Utah provide
"homicide resulting from the doing of any act greatly dangerous to the
lives of others and indicating a depraved mind . . . is punishable as
murder in the first degree"Y Florida, Wisconsin and Oregon statutes,
using identical terms, place the offense as murder in the second de-
gree.28 Minnesota makes by statute "such killings ... evincing a de-
praved mind . . . murder in the third degree"'  Mississippi, South
Dakota and North Dakota make no distinction as to the degree of
murder, thus following the common law.
The Kentucky statutes are conspicuous by the absence of any
statute which embraces criminal negligence.
The Statutes at Large, which cover the law of England and North
Ireland, contain no application of criminal negligence whatsoever.
However, a statute providing "whoever having charge of any car-lage
or vehicle shall by wanton or furious driving or racing or other willful
misconduct, or by willful neglect, do or cause to be done any bodily
harm to any person whatsoever, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor '"
may have some remote consideration of the element of criminal
negligence.
The Canadian Revised Statutes, though they apply English law,
wherever possible, are more specific in their treatment, wherein they
provide "homicide is either culpable or not culpable". It is "culpable"
when it consists of the killing of any person, either by an unlawful
act, or by an omission without lawful excuse".' Another statute pro-
vides that "culpable homicide is murder if he kills any person and
knew or should have known it likely to cause death though he may
have desired that his object should be effected without hurting any-
one". Another statute provides that "persons in charge of dangerous
things are under a legal duty to take reasonable precautions against
and use reasonable care to avoid such danger".-"
The Philippine Penal Code provides "any person who by reckless
imprudence shall commit any act which, if malice were present, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer a penalty ranging from arresto
mayor in its maximum degree, to prison correccionall in its minimum
3' Stat. of Colorado (Courtright, 1927), Sec. 1753; Consol. Laws of
New York (Cahill, 1930), Sec. 1044; Code of Alabama (1923), Sec.
4454; Code of Washington (Pierce, 1929), Sec. 8997; Rev. Stat. of
Utah 1933), c. 103-28-3.
28Comp. Gen. Laws of Florida (1927), Sec. 1137; Wisconsin Stat.
(1933), Sec. 340.03; Code of Oregon (1930), c. 14-203.
2' Minnesota Gen. Stat. (1923), Sec. 10070.
31 Statutes at Large, 24-5 V, c. 100, s. 6.
Canadian Rev. Stat. v. 1, c. 36, s. 252.
'Canadian Rev. Stat. v. 1, c. 36, s. 259.
3Canadian Rev. Stat. v. 1, c. 36, s. 247.
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degree".- This same statute applies under the Philippine Motor Ve-
hicle Statute.
The Philippine" statute recognizes three classes of negligence which
are: 1. Reckless negligence (lack of foresight). 2. Simple negligence
(less than reckless or gross negligence). 3. Simple imprudence or neg-
ligence (punishable as a misdemeanor). An example to illustrate the
distinction between the three: A man is walking on the left side of
his horse and wagon on the right side of the street. The man, horse
and wagon approach an intersection and turn at right angles. A child
is asleep in the gutter. The man is not reckless (since he could not
foresee a child would be asleep in the gutter). It is not a pure acci-
dent (since, had he looked, he would have seen the child). He did
no unlawful act (since he, the horse and wagon were on their own
side of the street).' He is guilty, then, of simple imprudence. It
must be noted that Philippine Law is not based on the English or
American concept of law, but since its law is what it is in relation
to criminal negligence, it merits consideration to that extent.
The Hawaiian statutes contain no express definition or application
of the term criminal negligence. However, a statute provides that in
the absence of premeditated intent, the offense shall constitute sec-
ond degree murder 3
In brief summarization, the statutes herein covered were selected
with a view to the particular recognition of the elements of criminal
negligence. It is perhaps an open question as to whether a state
should have any number of statutes covering what might be termed
isolated or specific cases of criminal negligence, or one basic statute
adequately defining what shall constitute criminal negligence by and
large. The writer is inclined to the latter viewpoint on the score of
uniform treatment in harmony with administration. The Texas statute
on negligent homicide previously referred to seems to most nearly
approximate such treatment. DAviD W. CAkRTER.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-OMISSION TO DISCHARGE A
LEGAL DUTY.
Properly speaking, criminal negligence is of two distinct types:
(1) positive or active negligence in the commission of an act and
(2) negative or passive negligence by omission to act at all. This
classification when first made was thought by the writer to be original
but upon further study it was found that substantially the same classi-
fication had been enunciated in Corpus Juris. In that work we find
these words: "A distinction is drawn in some cases between negli
gence in doing what a prudent man would not do, which is termed
"Philippine Code (Acts & Procedure), v. 1, Art. 568, p. 653.
Tbid.t Revised Stat. of Hawaii (1935), Chap. 193, Sees. 5990 and 5996.
